The evolution of exquisitely sensitive Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) systems is positioning this technology for use in time-critical environments, such as search-and-rescue missions and improvised explosive device (IED) detection. SAR systems should be playing a keystone role in the United States' Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance activities. Yet many in the SAR community see missed opportunities for incorporating SAR into existing remote sensing data collection and analysis challenges. Drawing on several years' of field research with SAR engineering and operational teams, this paper examines the human and organizational factors that mitigate against the adoption and use of SAR for tactical ISR and operational support. We suggest that SAR has a design problem, and that context-sensitive, human and organizational design frameworks are required if the community is to realize SAR's tactical potential.
INTRODUCTION
Technology designers often use the term "affordance" to refer to the features that enable people to recognize a potential use of that object, and to put it to use in solving a problem or performing a task.
Affordances can pop up serendipitously when a problem demands a solution using the resources at hand. If you have ever hammered a nail into plaster using your shoe, you have taken advantage of the heel's nail-driving affordances. But affordances, and the cues that alert us to their presence, may also be intentionally designed to promote visibility and accessibility. An intentionally designed consumer product, such as your high-end cell phone, typically includes multiple cues that communicate the phone's capabilities and the options for accessing those whenever you see fit.
This paper is about the need for intentional design practices that enable Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operators to access and apply the many affordances of Synthetic Aperture Radar. Good design is more than the visually elegant lines of your high-end cellular phone's casing, or its remarkably-small-but-high-capacity hard disk. Instead, good design takes conscious, systematic advantage of decades of empirical social and behavioral science to build systems, such as our phones, that cue human perceptual, cognitive, motor, and communicative abilities so that we can put our tools to use. Very good design goes beyond the individual-system interaction by considering context, to facilitate the integration of technology into existing networks of human communication and activity. That kind of holistic, context-sensitive design drives technology adoption; it is what transforms a few ounces of electronics, metal and glass into an absolutely indispensable tool for managing the myriad challenges of a busy life.
In this paper, we argue that in the context of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance workflows, Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is a high-capability technology whose potential is limited by the invisibility and inaccessibility of its many affordances; i.e., by the absence of intentional, context-sensitive, human-oriented design. We further assert that adoption of basic human-system integration and incremental development approaches can significantly improve the uptake and application of SAR systems in operational and tactical intelligence contexts.
The authors are an organizational anthropologist with 18 years' experience studying workflows and technology adoption in the United States' national security community; as well as a physicist who has spent her career developing, deploying, and maintaining remote sensing systems for both scientific and intelligence applications.
We have worked independently and as research partners in ISR programs at Sandia National Laboratories, primarily with the Laboratories' SAR engineers and deployed teams using Sandia systems. In that time, we have both come to admire SAR technology for its remarkable imaging capabilities and robustness to adverse collection conditions. We have also eard our colleagues express concern that the United States' ISR community is not using SAR resources to their full advantage.
h This paper presented us an opportunity to reflect on the general under-utilization of SAR in the United States' ISR mission space and to provide a human-oriented design perspective on this challenge. We draw on our own work in the SAR domain, including SAR system deployment activity; human factors-oriented field studies of operational teams in deployed settings; and implementation of user experience principles in SAR interface design. We also point to the extensive literature in human-computer interaction, human-system integration, organizational design and software engineering to suggest ways the community can reduce barriers to the adoption and application of SAR systems in ISR missions.
We open this paper with a brief introduction to the key concepts of technology adoption, usability, and utility, as well as various approaches to human-system design, all of which are germane to the problem of making SAR relevant in today's ISR mission space. As we discuss below, the United States government is increasingly recognizing that poor humansystem integration is the biggest obstacle to realizing the value of ISR investments in both military and civilian domains (Endsley 2015 (Endsley , 2016 . We explore some of the reasons underlying this situation and suggest ways that human-system integration and organizational design practices can facilitate the accessibility and application of SAR systems in operational settings.
ADOPTABLE, USABLE, USEFUL TECHNOLOGIES
Why do people, teams and organizations choose to use some tools and not others? Readers may be surprised to learn that an innovation's intrinsic performance advantages play a relatively small role in the adoption and spread of a technology throughout society. Making a system usable, useful, and adoptable also requires paying attention to the physical, perceptual and cognitive needs of the intended human users, along with an understanding of the broader context in which they will put the system to use.
Why Technologies are Adopted: Diffusion Theory
Everett Rogers' Diffusion of Innovations is the classic articulation of diffusion theory, covering four decades' of research in technology adoption and social transformation (Rogers, 2003 ; even clocking in at over 500 pages, it is an absolutely fascinating read that will change your perspective on how we choose what we use). In Rogers' model, innovation adoption requires a confluence of social and technological factors. The technology should be "better" than its predecessors; but for "better" to become standard practice, the innovation must complement what already exists -both practices and artifacts -in the domain of application. This is common sense: we are less likely to use something new if the tool conflicts significantly with everything we are already using, or if there is simply an easier way to achieve a similar end.
But equally critical is the dissemination of information about the technology within the peer network that represents the pool of potential users. As Rogers explains, the probability of innovation diffusion increases as more and more people exchange information about how they put the tool to use, their experience in doing so, any challenges they might have encountered, how they overcame those challenges, and whether the effort was worth the result. This generates the famous "S" curve descriptive of technology adoption: early adopters explore the technology and spread information about its applicability; "takeoff" describes a rapid increase in the rate of adoption as information about users' experience with the technology spreads; and finally the diffusion rate peters out to an asymptotic upper tail as the pool of potential users shrinks to the final holdouts -some of whom will never change their practices (Rogers 2003 ; see also Rogers and Shoemaker 1971 ).
We begin with diffusion theory to emphasize that the overall adoptability of a system is not determined by the intrinsic properties of the technology itself, but requires understanding the abilities and needs of the human users and the context of use. This brings us to the twin concepts of usability and utility.
Usability vs. Utility
Over the past twenty years, as Western society has been permeated by digital electronics, usability design and engineering have become major fields of research study, and practice. It is common for people to think about usability as encompassing every aspect of user's interaction with a technology, but in practice it is something quite specific and somewhat limited. In our experience, usability refers to those characteristics of a technology that facilitate a user's understanding of its operation. Associated concepts include discoverability (can a new user figure out how to access an operation without explicit instructions?), memorability (can an individual remember how to access that feature, once they've discovered it?), and accessibility (can people with varying degrees of physical or psychological capability operate the system?). Properties such as discoverability, memorability and accessibility are well-described in the usability literature and can be straightforwardly measured through standard usability testing protocols (see, for example, the United States' federal usability guidance and advice at www.usability.gov).
Utility, in contrast, has more to do with the possibilities for using a technology to solve a contextually relevant problem. The concept of "context" is key here, since utility really describes the match between a technology and a problemsolving environment, in addition to whether or not a human can put the system to use. A technology has the property of utility only insofar as it facilitates people doing what they need to get done. If something is not useful, it is unlikely to be used, no matter how elegant the interface or well-trained the operators may be. In fact, when motivation and need are high enough, utility trumps usability, simply because people are extremely good at making due with what they have.
The importance of utility was made clear in an interface redesign study we performed for a radar operator software platform associated with a SAR system designed to meet an urgent operational requirement. The operating software "system" comprised a mashup of MATLAB functions, scripts, loggers, Microsoft Excel spreadsheets, and geospatial navigational feeds from the operating platform, all accessible through various and sundry windows. The SAR operators laughingly described the interface as complicated, hard to learn, crowded, redundant. Even the software's developers acknowledged it was more suited for experimental engineering than tactical information collection. Yet the SAR teams made the system work, even in high-stress and ambiguous operational settings. We learned that the radar operators had devised their own ways of managing the display's visual complexity; for example, by arranging its myriad panels into layered sets of indicators supportive of overall situation awareness, and by putting frequently-used functions into accessible areas of the display. Motivated by the needs of their stakeholders, they had transformed a confusing array of indicators and elements into a working command and control interface, ensuring the radar was generating timely, relevant products for dissemination to intelligence consumers.
This vignette should not be read as an argument for relying on motivated users to overcome awful interfaces. Our point is that sensor usability, utility, and adoptability are complicated problems, full of caveats and contingencies that cannot be addressed by fixing bad interfaces or redesigning ergonomically clueless ground station layouts (of which we have seen many examples). Maximizing the effectiveness of our remote sensing investments -making them into the kinds of technologies that people rely upon -requires that we attend to the entire context of an ISR operation, from sensor operators to the intelligence consumers they are supporting. Like all ISR technologies, making SAR truly effective requires holistic thinking within and beyond the ground station -from displays and input devices that facilitate human performance, to architectures that enable timely access to critical data in the face of rapidly evolving mission demands.
WHY NOT SAR?
Over the past twenty years or so, the United States has outfitted its collection platforms with a diverse plethora of sensor systems: signals and electronics intelligence collection systems, electro-optical and infrared full-motion video, multispectral imaging systems, and others. SAR systems are common payloads on both satellite and airborne systems supporting military and civilian intelligence collections.
SAR's Many Affordances
SAR is a remarkable sensor, and we are not just saying that because we work with dozens of passionate radar engineers and technicians. It has some quite unique capabilities: unlike the mostly passive collection systems that populate ISR platforms, SAR relies on active illumination, which means it is an effective imaging system with or without solar radiation, even in adverse weather conditions such as cloud cover and light rain. SAR enables powerful field-of-view surveillance and mapping; it is relatively less constrained than its electro-optical counterparts by standoff rangedependent resolution requirements. Algorithms that capitalize on the scattering and reflection properties of physical entities enable the detection of objects that might not be visible using an EO focal plane due to masking or obscuration. Complex data generated by SAR systems is highly exploitable, enabling generation of a dizzying array of highresolution image products. For example, accurate and precise geo-registration affords generation of coherent change detection (CCD) images from repeat-pass collection operations, revealing both the location and time of even subtle changes to ground, such as human footprints appearing in loose soil. Combining SAR imagery with data from other products, including EO/IR and DTED information, opens the door to an even richer library of image products to support intelligence analytics and operations. Moreover, SAR capabilities are highly complementary with other remote sensing systems in dynamic operations: for example, SAR affords moving target indicator (MTI) data collection for the detection of moving entities in a scene, cueing collectors to critical ground activity that merits electro-optical scrutiny.
In theory, SAR's powerful affordances should make it a favored imaging system for the diverse, dynamic missions that ISR operators fly. However, in the ISR collection environments that we have observed, full-motion electro-optical and infrared sensors, along with moving target indicator systems, seem to be workhorse technologies for situation awareness and operational support during deployed missions. In the ISR world, SAR often sits on the metaphorical shelf, which is a deeply frustrating and perplexing problem for proponents of the technology (Doerry 2014).
Please Don't Blame the Operator!
What explains the underutilization of such a powerful remote sensing technology? In programmatic research and development activities with our engineers, program personnel, and other "supply" side professional colleagues, we frequently hear that the biggest barrier to SAR is the user sitting at the operational workstation. In this narrative, operational teams are deliberately choosing other ISR systems over SAR to meet collection requirements, because they do not understand SAR, or they did not receive enough training in SAR data exploitation, or because they are more comfortable reading other types of sensor output. Note that "user" in this context describes the individuals or teams proximate to the sensor system and responsible for operating it; for example, deployed teams flying remotely piloted aircraft supporting tactical missions. The assumption is that these operators have agency to decide which sensor to use for a particular collection request, and that they are defaulting to something that is not SAR.
This is a good example of what psychologists call a fundamental attribution error: the tendency to explain someone's actions in terms of individual motivation or disposition, without considering how situational factors both enable and constrain what people perceive as reasonable and appropriate action. But situational factors, including the policies and procedures that govern ISR activities, the architectures through which data are disseminated, and the expectations of intelligence consumers, all play an extremely important role in shaping how tactical ISR operators do their jobs. As we discuss below, if SAR systems are not being used to their full remote sensing potential, the fault does not sit with the operator. Nor is it a problem with the sensor technology. Instead, we point to larger-scale situational factors (such as the variable integration of SAR systems into existing ISR management structures) interacting with major usability deficits to limit the adoption of SAR in a number of ISR mission domains.
Usability and Usefulness in SAR
In our work with SAR researchers, engineering teams, and deployed systems, we have catalogued a long list of issues that collectively contribute to the underutilization of these sensors in the ISR domain, from chaotic operating interfaces to the poor integration of the sensor into broader ISR collection, dissemination and production policies. We briefly summarize some major issues with system usability and utility that we have encountered, as a way of motivating the final section's recommendations for the application of human-system integration and incremental development practices in the design, development, and deployment of SAR systems.
Issue: Poor Usability in Command and Control
First, the operational hardware and software used to command and control SAR sensors simply do not follow the basic design and interaction principles established in decades' worth of human-computer interaction research. This is perhaps not surprising, as most operational software and interfaces are created by radar engineering teams who are not in the business of designing interfaces for non-engineers. Instead, their job is to ensure that radars are performing as intended. Engineering interfaces written in MATLAB are highly comprehensible for engineers used to MATLAB; they do a good job supporting engineering research and development work activities, such as testing antenna performance or image formation algorithms, because they instantiate the engineering workflow in domain-standard software interfaces, symbols and terminology.
Problems crop up when software systems designed by and for engineering teams are transitioned to fielded systems for sensor operators who are, by definition, not engineers. They find themselves making do with interfaces that are bettersuited to engineering R&D tasks. For example, error messages are full of cryptic engineering jargon and notations. Options and settings areas provide access to levels of system functionality that should probably only be available to engineering technicians or system administrators. Not only does this make it difficult for operators to find the information they need; but it is all too easy for a novice to change a setting that should remain fixed.
If we want the ISR community to use SAR, we should provide better interfaces. But we should work to understand the factors that shape sensor-related decision-making in ISR ground station environments: in other words, why do people choose what sensors to use? This brings us to the more difficult question of SAR utility.
Issue: Useful Technologies in Distributed Cognitive Systems
In our experience, sensor operators are not the primary consumers of sensor data; i.e., they are typically not running a sensor to support individual or even local decision-making. Instead, operators are responsible for managing a sensor to meet the information needs of intelligence consumers, many working at a geographical and/or organizational distance from the sensor operator. This web of relationships is important, because although a sensor operator has some discretion in matching a sensor or a modality to a request, her understanding of intelligence customer needs will influence decisions about which sensors to use.
For example, during one field visit, an ISR team leader told us that operational crews were trained in SAR, but tended not to use the radar simply because because the data could not easily be sent through established dissemination channels. As a result, even the sensor operators who thought SAR was "cool" did not use SAR in their collection missions. As the team lead emphasized, this was not a problem that could be solved locally; i.e., within the ground station. External stakeholders had become reliant on other sensor products and tended not to think of SAR as an option for their tasking requests, which made it even less likely the sensor operators would attempt to use radar imagery to meet those requests.
The negative reinforcement was difficult to overcome, since dissemination issues limited what sensor operators could do to "educate" their stakeholders on other sensor capabilities.
As the vignette illustrates, understanding the network of tasking-collection-and-dissemination relationships, from interorganizational expectations to information architectures, is important for understanding why people choose the sensors they use. Sensor operators are not independent actors, but are members of a distributed cognitive system (Hutchins 2000) . In the cognitive science and organizational science literature, a distributed cognitive system exists when individual workers occupying particular roles coordinate an interdependent set of problem-solving activities in the context of achieving an important goal, such as managing situation awareness while navigating an aircraft carrier into a shallow harbor (Hutchins 1995 ). Distributed cognitive systems may recognize themselves as members of a team, or simply as part of a network; they may be physically collocated or geographically distributed; their work may be tightly temporally coordinated or members may work asynchronously, depending on how the activity is organized and the communications technologies that exist to support it. The key characteristic is collaborative cognitive work across multiple individuals, enabled by systems of communication that facilitate the exchange of information and the maintenance of a shared mental model across those actors (Hutchins 2000) .
Understanding that sensor operators are acting as members of a distributed cognitive system reveals the limitations of usability-oriented fixes for SAR. Investing in easier-to-use interfaces and enhancing operator training can certainly improve the operational user experience, but are probably insufficient to remedy systemic issues with SAR underutilization, simply because decisions about sensor tasking are collectively established through informal expectations as well as formal policies and procedures. Fortunately, there are well-established, easily accessible frameworks for designing and implementing technologies that address these organizational challenges, as we discuss below.
MAKING SAR USEFUL: HUMAN-SYSTEM INTEGRATION AND INCREMENTAL DEVELOPMENT
None of the problems we have discussed in this paper can be solved with enhanced antenna performance, new image formation algorithms, or better operator training (though all are good things). Instead, making SAR systems useful, usable, and adoptable in the ISR community will require at least two major changes in the way we develop and deploy these systems. The first change is incorporating basic usability and context-sensitive, human-oriented design practices into SAR system development and deployment, to ensure that stakeholders are implementing systems that fit well with the broader organizational context. The second change is pursuing these contextual design approaches as part of an incremental development approach, similar to those prescribed so-called "agile" software development philosophies, which emphasize continuously tailoring the technology to meet emerging demands in the context of use.
Usability is only one aspect of integrating systems into human-managed workflows. Those of us with backgrounds in user experience research, human-computer interaction, and/or human factors are often surprised to discover that many US government ISR systems, not just SAR, suffer from human-system integration problems. This is because fields such as human factors, engineering psychology, and ergonomics all grew from US government investments in aviation safety during and after World War II, when it became apparent that cockpit displays were causing distraction and disorientation, leading to poor pilot performance and aviation disasters. Later, in the early 1980s, the US Army's MANPRINT program established human-systems integration as a field of practice, influencing acquisitions throughout the Department of Defense for the next two decades. And since the 1990s, the US government has funded a broad portfolio of research and development in human-computer and human-machine interaction across a broad array of technology areas, from space programs to civilian aviation to personal computing (Downey and Rosales 2012).
Why this knowledge is not making it into today's ISR operational workstations is beyond the scope of this paper (although Endsley suggests that acquisition program changes in the 1990s devalued human factors-related performance specifications; see Endsley 2016) . Fortunately, the human-computer interaction and human-system integration literature provides ample guidance for developing systems that facilitate usability, utility, and adoptability. We discuss some of the frameworks that our researchers use at Sandia, arguing that human-system integration research is best applied in the context of an incremental design, development, and delivery framework that supports ongoing refinement of the technology for the intended domain of application.
Enhance Usability
As discussed above, usability describes those properties that enable people to discover and learn system functionality, and to access and apply that functionality efficiently, with minimal system-induced error (Wickens and Hollands 1999) . The human-computer interaction literature is full of empirically-supported guidance that promotes usability. The Nielsen Heuristics are one of the most cited sources of guidance for interface designers (Nielsen and Molich 1990) . Developed through empirical studies examining factors associated with technology learnability, memorability, and discoverability, the ten heuristics translate basic principles from psychology into guidelines for designing systems that support human interaction (Fig. 2) .
Figure 2: The Nielsen Heuristics
Applying principles such as the Nielsen Heuristics to the development of SAR operational interfaces could significantly enhance system usability. For example, consider the principle of consistency and standards in interface design. Maintaining a common set of symbols and terms facilitates system discoverability and learnability, because users do not have to re-learn a visual vocabulary to access the capability they need. For example, representational systems from aviation and/or other ISR domains may facilitate SAR interface learnability by using the same geospatial situation awareness cues that operators are likely to have learned in other work environments. One might also look for ways to enhance consistency in terms of operating platform conventions: e.g., when developing operational software on a Windows environment, one can consult extensive Microsoft design guidance to ensure that icons and layouts conform to precedent.
The Nielsen Usability Heuristics (from Nielsen and Moloch 1990; available at nngroup.com/articles/ten-usability-heuristics/) Visibility of system status, to ensure the user knows what is going on with the system as she uses it, including error conditions and ways of getting out of those;
Congruence between the system and the domain of application (the "real world,") to facilitate the user developing a correct mental model of how the system works and what it is doing; User control and freedom, including the ability to easily undo operations, so that the user can access functionality, determine whether that is the correct action, then back out of the operation without significant cost; Consistency and standards, so that when the user learns one symbol she can trust it means the same thing throughout all phases of system operation;
Minimize the opportunity for error; for example, by including dialog boxes that require the user to confirm an action or parameter change;
Minimize demand on user memory; instead, provide cues that enable her to recognize where she is in a workflow;
Make systems flexible and accommodating to a wide range of experience levels by allowing users to tailor the system to their needs -for example, enabling experts to automate an operation can facilitate their work, while novices might benefit from performing the operation themselves so they can learn how the system works;
Minimize visual clutter with a minimalist aesthetic, so that users do not have to search through multiple menus, indicators, and frames to find the operator they are seeking;
Ensure that the system communicates errors quickly and clearly, including options for fixing the error so that the user can get through it and move along with her work; Provide necessary and sufficient documentation for system functions, in case users need additional guidance.
Investing in better interfaces can enhance SAR's reputation in the ISR community, if only by making the system's key functions more accessible to a broader range of skill sets in the operational user community. However, we do not believe that better interfaces are entirely sufficient for solving the sensor underutilization problem that worries so many of our colleagues. Instead, SAR needs intentional human-systems integration that positions SAR for impact on the intelligence activities that sensor operators are supporting.
Utility Requires Intentional Integration
Usability helps individual operators make sense of the tools at their disposal -if those tools are useful for the workflows they are responsible for achieving. To address the problem of utility, Sandia's interdisciplinary "human analytics" R&D teams (i.e., "analytics for humans") draw extensively on Activity Theory (Nardi 2009 ) and Cognitive Work Analysis (Vicente 1999) , which provide complementary guidance for documenting how people use technology to perform work effectively, and to guide the introduction of new technologies into those work environments. For example, Cognitive Work Analysis been used to design operational interfaces and decision support systems to promote operator situation awareness in high-consequence industrial systems, such as nuclear power stations, while Activity Theory informs design studies for consumer electronics.
In the past, Sandia teams have used CWA approaches in qualitative research projects aimed at decomposing imagery analytic workflows, to inform the design of "big data" software prototypes aimed at optimizing human attentional resources in high-throughput, multi-intelligence threat detection workflows (Stevens-Adams et al 2014). A few weeks' investment in studying how analysts perform their work revealed the importance external data and information sources in analytic judgment, which the algorithm experts on our team had not uncovered in their more limited interactions with the intended user community. CWA-informed analyses also helped our human analytics researchers design a number of visual perception experiments that revealed the centrality of particular image products in threat signature characterization (McNamara et al 2015).
These frameworks are not recipe books for designing great tools. Instead, they tell us what questions we should be asking about a work environment, and how we can use that information to develop better (i.e., more useful, more usable) technologies for people. Unfortunately, there is a lot of jargon associated with Activity Theory and CWA, and they can be tough to understand and implement without help from human factors professionals who know the theory and methods associated with these approaches. More accessible guidance is available through the Department of Defense, which has extensive resources for incorporating human factors and context-oriented design practices into the development of new systems.
For example, DoD's Human-Systems Integration (HSI) program distills the military's extensive human factors knowledge into clear principles for designing useful, usable operational technologies (Maybury 2012 , USAF 2012 , Endsley 2015 . DOD HSI guidance defines systems as networks of human actors, software, and hardware elements interacting in the context of an operational environment. Key domains include manpower, personnel, training, human factors engineering, environment, occupational health and system safety, survivability, and habitability (USAF 2012). Although we have not used HSI guidance in our work, we are familiar with its content and we appreciate its emphasis on the perceptual, cognitive, and communicative of human users as a starting point in the design engineering process. In addition, the approach calls attention to the fit of the technology with existing systems, work practices, and personnel capabilities, all of which play a critical role in the ultimate adoptability of a technology. Finally, DoD provides training and documentation to help system engineering teams use HSI practices in their projects (Endsley 2016 ).
From Waterfall to Iterative and Incremental
Human-oriented design could make significant improvements in the utility and usability of SAR systems, but there is a catch. These frameworks tend to be most effective when they are implemented in the context of an incremental, iterative development process, preferably one that engages representatives of the user community as design stakeholders (see for example Leinonen et al 2008) . In contrast, most ISR systems (especially the really big programs) are managed as waterfall projects. In software engineering, "waterfall" describes a plan-focused, sequential design and development process, in which requirements are established at the outset of a project and tracked through the project's evolution until the final product is delivered (Dybå and Dingsøyr 2008) . Theoretically, waterfall minimizes risk and promotes accountability through ongoing requirements specification and management. In practice, waterfall projects often produce in systems that meet all the requirements but miss the mark, either because the intended context of use has changed; or the requirements were not interpreted correctly; or because the initial requirements were simply wrong.
Since the early 2000s, the software engineering community has vocally rejected waterfall in favor of a variety of socalled "iterative and incremental" development processes. In theory, these reduce the risk of producing a less-thanuseful technology through iterative cycles of designing-building-testing-revising (Larman and Basili 2003; Dybå and Dingsøyr 2008) . Working with representatives of the intended user community, engineers create system prototypes that instantiate testable hypotheses about user activities and needs (Leionen et al 2008) . Prototyping is critical, since putting a system in front of users powerfully reveals erroneous or incomplete assumptions in design decision-making. Lessons learned are incorporated into the next iteration, and so on through an established number of of intermediate delivery cycles, until the final product is complete.
Although incremental development approaches are popular in the software industry, they are less common in other technology fields (such as sensor development). Nor are they mainstream practice in government agencies, which tend to follow waterfall/sequential project management guidance for information, communication, and other technology acquisitions programs. This is despite the fact that federal oversight bodies, including the Office of Management and Budget and the Government Accountability Office, have urged government agencies to pursue incremental development cycles to enhance the usability and utility of technologies used in federal workplaces (see especially Powner 2012).
Incremental frameworks were developed for software project management, but the principles are certainly relevant for other types of technology development efforts. ISR systems such as SAR are technologically sophisticated and their capabilities are evolving rapidly; and the rapid, inexorable evolution of national intelligence priorities and requirements only complicates these technology challenges. Ensuring that our sensor capabilities are packaged in a way that enhances user performance requires continuous evaluation and adjustment of design decisions to ensure a good fit between the ISR system, its user community, and the mission space they are responsible for managing.
In this regard, incremental management does have one clear advantage over waterfall, and that is its flexibility in responding to changes in system requirements. The ISR world evolves rapidly -not just in terms of what sensors are capable of capturing, but the intelligence requirements that operators are addressing and the technological infrastructure that supports cross-organizational sensor tasking, data collection, and intelligence compilation and dissemination. Ensuring that operators are provided usable systems that enable them to meet customer intelligence demands requires development paradigms that emphasize ongoing domain characterization, system evaluation, and continuous user feedback. Incremental, iterative design frameworks achieve just that, and have additional benefit of establishing ownership among the operator community, who are stakeholders in the development of technologies intended for their use.
CONCLUSION
We believe that SAR systems are among the most exquisite remote sensing technologies available for ISR operational workflows. In this paper, we have explored a few of the challenges associated with making SAR systems usable and useful in complicated, dynamic, cross-organizational world of ISR tasking, collections, exploitation and analysis. However, the problems we describe are present throughout the ISR domain, and particularly in the United States' military and civilian intelligence community, which has seen explosive growth in the number, types, and capabilities of remote sensing systems at its disposal.
Integrating rapidly evolving capabilities into rapidly evolving mission areas is a significant design challenge, one that is not served by throwing technology over the fence and expecting operators to figure out how to make it useful. Contextual design practices that begin with research about the user community and their work context could play an important role in making SAR an adoptable -i.e., useful and used -system in the ISR constellation. In addition, program maangers and technical staff should question whether "waterfall" frameworks that dominate large-scale acquisition programs are really generating technologies that people can use effectively. Perhaps it is time to adopt some of the software engineering community's practices: know your users, understand the context of their work, pay attention to usability, and pursue incremental development frameworks that intentionally seek to maximize the fit between a technology and the people who will someday be asked to operate it.
